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WHERE ARE THE JOBS IN THE JOBS
ACT? AN EXAMINATION OF THE
UNEASY CONNECTION BETWEEN
SECURITIES DISCLOSURE AND JOB
CREATION
IAN K. PECK*
The JOBS Act, passed in April 2012, is designed to produce American
jobs through removing various regulatory barriers for small companies
to access investor capital. As the regulations continue to be
implemented, commentators have dissected the various ways in which
the JOBS Act attempts to achieve this goal. One of the methods
involves making the IPO process initially less burdensome, through
scaling back financial and corporate governance disclosures.
Crowdfunding, which will eventually permit companies to raise investor
capital through an online 'funding portal, " has garnered both deep
criticism from regulators and praise from small business owners. Yet
little attention has been paid to the notion that the very reason for
disclosure reform is job creation. This matters because job creation
has not historically played a direct role in the reform of securities
disclosure statutes and regulations. This Article analyzes what role, if
any, job creation should occupy in the reform of securities disclosure
laws. After establishing the normative baseline for disclosure theory
and reform, this Article highlights various unintended consequences of
using job creation as a justification for reform and proposes a
framework for understanding job creation-based isclosure reforms
going forward.
* Associate, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C.; J.D., Boston University
School of Law; LL.M., UC Berkeley School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Robert
Bartlett at UC Berkeley School of Law for supervising this paper and for providing
invaluable insight throughout. I am also grateful to the panelists of the 2013 Berkeley
Business Law Journal Symposium for their helpful comments on this topic. I would
also like to acknowledge Professor David Webber at Boston University School of Law
and Daniel Castafio of UC Berkeley School of Law for their continued guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the many ailments caused by the 2008 financial crisis, the
unemployment rate in the United States served as a direct indicator of the
challenges the American economy and its workers faced. Unemployment
rose to yearly averages of over nine percent in 2009 and 2010. Only since
October of 2012 has the figure dipped below eight percent despite
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relatively modest job gains.' Strengthening the American economy, with
job creation at the helm, was a central issue during the 2012 presidential
race that ultimately saw the incumbent Barack Obama victorious.
While various job-creation mechanisms have been employed, only one
has utilized the federal securities laws as its catalyst: The Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act ("the JOBS Act" or "the Act"). The JOBS Act,
signed into law on April 5, 2012, is somewhat unique among job-creation
policies in that it works not through the tax code or the Federal Reserve but
rather through federal securities laws. Indeed, the purpose of the Act is
"[t]o increase American job creation and economic growth by improving
access to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies
["EGCs"]."2 The Act, really a series of five unique bills rolled into one,
generally strives to make it easier and more efficient for EGCs to gain
access to investor capital. More American jobs will be created, so the
rationale goes, when small companies tap needed capital to grow and hire
workers. The JOBS Act received nearly unanimous support in Congress,3
as it attained a certain popularity summed up by the following sentiments
from a congresswoman:
The JOBS Act is a legislative package designed to move our economy
and restore opportunities for America's primary job creators, our small
businesses, start-ups, and entrepreneurs. These measures create capital
formation, will spur the growth of start-ups and small businesses, and
pave the way for more small-scale businesses to go public and create
more jobs. In his State of the Union, the President asked us to send him
a bill that helps small businesses and entrepreneurs, and that's exactly
what the JOBS Act does.4
To achieve its goal of efficiently connecting EGCs with willing
investors, the JOBS Act primarily reforms the disclosure requirements of
the Securities Act of 1933 ("'33 Act"). For example, for companies
pursuing an initial public offering ("IPO") Title I of the Act (part of which
includes the "IPO on ramp") eases the public disclosure requirements over
the first five years of its publicly listed status. As this paper will discuss in
greater detail in Section III, data suggest that for EGCs, IPOs add a greater
1. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE - SEASONALLY ADJUSTED, available at
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z l ebjpgk2654c l_&met_yunemploym
entrate&idim=country:US&fdim_y-seasonality:S&dl=en&hl=en&qwus%20unemplo
y.ment%20rate (last updated June 9, 2015).
2. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 126-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012).
3. See FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 110 (2012), available at
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/rollll0.xml; see also Edward Wyatt, Senate Passes
Start-Ups Bill, With Amendments, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), at BI.
4. 158 CONG. REC. H1219 (Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Capito).
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number of jobs than mergers or acquisitions.' Title I of the JOBS Act can
be seen as a way to revive lagging IPO activity, while the cause of such
stagnation serves as a topic for debate.
Another example of disclosure reform is found in Title III
("crowdfunding"), where certain emerging companies will be permitted to
solicit investments from a broad range of retail investors over the Internet
without having to register their issued securities. Instead of incenting
companies to pursue an IPO, the crowdfunding provision provides a
method for undertaking a private offering while still gaining access to
everyday retail investors. Through crowdfunding, Congress might have
realized that not all small businesses are willing or able to undertake an
IPO yet still have a need for investor capital.
On the surface, these changes to the '33 Act (and others that round out
the JOBS Act) appear to create workable solutions to the challenging issue
of high unemployment. However, amidst all of the momentum surrounding
the JOBS Act, one versed in United States securities law may rightly step
back and ponder whether those laws should serve as a springboard for job
creation. This paper asks what role, if any, should job creation play as a
justification for securities disclosure reform. While American securities
law is at least indirectly connected to job creation and the growth of various
types of enterprises, to what extent should we use securities disclosure law
as the means to achieve job growth? I identify at least three possible
concerns with such direct usage of disclosure law in the job creation realm.
Two of the concerns may be deemed "unintended consequences" of the
JOBS Act and the third might be considered a definitional issue, equating
"capital formation" with "job creation."
First, if investor protection is subordinated to achieve gains in capital
formation and job creation, then it is likely that such investments will be
seen as riskier or at least less certain than an investment at pre JOBS Act
levels. Uncertainty and risk tend to raise the cost of capital for issuers. It
is possible, therefore, that the benefits of the JOBS Act would be
outweighed by the costs imposed by investors demanding investment price
protection. Second, especially given concerns over the potential for
deceitful activity in crowdfunding and the IPO on ramp, if investor capital
is allocated to weak or fraudulent issuers, the result could be job losses not
job gains. Finally, there is a concern with equating capital formation with
job creation. While the two do overlap, I argue that they are not precisely
the same and that there is a danger in not recognizing the differences.
5. Rebuilding the IPO On-Ramp, Putting Emerging Companies and the Job
Market Back on the Road to Growth, IPO TASK FORCE, at 5 (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding the-ipo on-ramp.pdf.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the various
justifications for disclosure law reform over the history of federal U.S.
securities regulation, setting the normative baseline for such reform.
Section III then analyzes whether and to what extent the JOBS Act alters
disclosure theory. Section IV answers my primary question of what role, if
any, job creation should play in the calculus of disclosure reform. Section
V concludes.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCLOSURE REFORM: THE NORMATIVE BASELINE
Since their inception in 1933, federal securities laws have been reformed
as a response to various influences. The Securities and Exchange
Commission's ("SEC") mission is to "protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation".6  This
mission statement neatly tracks two primary justifications for securities
disclosure reform: investor protection and capital formation. To be sure,
one instance of disclosure reform may reflect the other justification.
However, at its core, each reform highlights one of the two principal
justifications. To illuminate the two categories of justifications, I will
provide examples of disclosure reforms driven by each. Instead of delving
into the technical operation of each reform, my goal is to tease out what
exactly the reform says about the motivations behind changes to disclosure
laws.
A. Investor Protection Reforms
1. The Securities Act of 1933
Investor protection may appear to be the most obvious or intuitive
rationale for introducing or reforming securities disclosure laws and
regulations. Regulation by its very nature can be seen as a way to place
limits on private enterprises so that all participants may be treated fairly.
For the sake of consistency, I will define investor protection reforms as
those reforms designed primarily to benefit investors by requiring securities
issuers to take some affirmative action by providing investors with material
information about the investment. In addition, investor protection reforms
are often coupled with enforcement mechanisms that offer recourse to
investors claiming that issuers shirked their disclosure responsibilities.
The first such reform, the '33 Act, is perhaps the best example of an
investor protection measure. While the '33 Act may rightly be categorized
as a response to economic crisis (the Great Depression), the Act focuses its
6. The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
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immediate attention on laying out a system whereby securities issuers are
compelled to disclose certain types of information to potential investors.
James M. Landis, one of the '33 Act's principal drafters wrote firsthand
about the impetus for federal legislation concerning the offer and sale of
securities.
The act naturally had its beginnings in the high financing of the Twenties
that was followed by the market crash of 1929. [A Senate Banking and
Currency Committee investigation] indicted a system as a whole that had
failed miserably in imposing those essential fiduciary standards that
should govern persons whose function it was to handle other people's
money. Investment bankers, brokers and dealers, corporate directors,
accountants, all found themselves the object of criticism so severe that
the American public lost much of its faith in professions that had
theretofore been regarded with a respect that had approached awe.
At the heart of the '33 Act regime is the concept of mandated disclosure.
The drafters recognized that for too long securities issuers were able to
select the information, if any, they disclosed to investors. As Landis wrote,
"Our draft remained true to the conception voiced by the President ...
namely that its requirements should be limited to full and fair disclosure of
the nature of the security being offered and that there should be no
authority to pass upon the investment quality of the security."9 Simply put,
the '33 Act was instituted to ensure that companies issuing securities in
public offerings would provide material ex ante disclosure to investors.
While some state securities disclosure regimes passed on the merits of
securities offerings (known as merit review), the '33 Act chose instead to
favor disclosure and let investors decide on the merits.
While the decision was made to favor disclosure over merit review, the
'33 Act contains various provisions that may subject issuers and related
parties to civil liability for material misrepresentations or failure to disclose
material information.'0 The disclosure and civil liability elements of the
'33 Act reveal an important observation underpinning securities disclosure
law: the push and pull between investor protection and capital formation."
On one hand, the '33 Act strives to leave behind the caveat emptor
7. The federal securities laws came some ten to twenty years after the passage of
state "blue sky" laws. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky
Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229 (2003).
8. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 30 (1959).
9. Id. at 34.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2013).
11. Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review
of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 367, 368 (2008).
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approach of pre-federal securities law.1 2 On the other hand, there is the
concern that too much government intervention could stifle capital
formation and economic growth.13 This paradigm is the essential tension of
United States securities disclosure law.
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 12(g)
Issuers of securities whose stock is traded on an exchange are required to
release on-going disclosures pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("'34 Act"). This makes sense because while issuers must release a
registration statement during an initial public offering, as time goes on,
material changes occur that require continuous updates, yet the issuer's
securities will continue to be bought and sold by investors on the secondary
market. However, before 1964, issuers of securities whose stock traded in
the over the counter markets ("OTC") were not required to register and
provide on-going investor disclosure. This split resulted in high
transparency (and presumably more accurate pricing) in listed securities but
not those trading in the OTC markets.
The split was recognized as a problem because of the ever-increasing
prominence of the OTC markets. As one SEC Commissioner at the time
noted:
It is abundantly clear that the over-the-counter markets are not now, if
indeed they ever were, insignificant in their scope and economic impact.
They involve thousands of corporations and hundreds of thousands of
investors. The Securities Act Amendments of 1964 effectively remove
the distinction which has existed as to a large number of the companies
whose securities are traded over-the-counter.14
Section 12 of the '34 Act was reformed in order to "remove the
distinction" between the disclosures the two types of investors received.
Prior to the JOBS Act, Section 12(g)(1) subjected issuers, with total ssets
exceeding $10 million and equities held of record by 500 or more persons,
to the same on-going disclosure regime that exchange-listed companies
must comply with.15  This reform demonstrates at least one important
characteristic of investor protection: fluidity. As the nature of the
12. Garland S. Ferguson, Jr., Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Address
on the Securities Act of 1933 (Sept. 12, 1933).
13. David R. Burton Reducing the Burden on Small Public Companies Would
Promote Innovation, Job Creation, and Economic Growth, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (June 20, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/06/
reducing-the-burden-on-small-public-companies-would-promote-innovation-job-
creation-and-economic-growth.
14. Hugh F. Owens, Commissioner, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, Address Before the Practicing Law Institute (Oct. 16, 1964).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 781.
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marketplace changes, so too does the character of investor protection.
While 12(g)(1) made an arbitrary cutoff at 500 holders of record, the SEC
recognized that at least for relatively large OTC-traded companies, there
was "no logical basis for the distinction made by the Exchange Act
between listed and unlisted securities."
Yet another lesson from investor protection reforms, shown clearly by
12(g), is that they may have negative unintended consequences for capital
formation.'7 If an unlisted company crosses the investor threshold, they do
not automatically become a "listed" company subject to S-I registration.
However, this is the practical effect. If a company must regularly disclose
sensitive information, they may as well attempt to take advantage of the
deep capital of the public markets. The most recent high profile example
of this phenomenon is Facebook, who surpassed the then-existing 500
holders of record limit.18 Much has been written about the Facebook IPO,
but for purposes of this paper, it is simply worth noting that perhaps
Facebook would have waited longer to go public had it not been required to
register under 12(g). This problem can be true particularly for smaller
companies that may have to take a less aggressive financing approach in
order to stay below the 12(g) threshold.19
Investor protection reforms to securities disclosure follow a general
pattern. First, there is a perceived ill that must be remedied in order to
ensure that investors receive the assurance they need to participate in
United States securities markets. Second, the remedy usually comes in the
form of enhanced or more widespread disclosure from the issuer to the
investor. Disclosure, not merit review, is the cornerstone of investor
protection in United States securities law, and it is natural that protection
reforms build upon that principle.20 Third and finally, we can look at the
reform's effects on capital formation and ask whether the costs to capital
formation are offset by the benefits of investor protection. In summary,
regulators and lawmakers who pass investor protection measures come to
16. See supra note 14, at 3.
17. Sometimes the consequences are known at the time of reform, it is just that the
benefits outweigh the costs in the eyes of the reformer.
18. The "Facebook Problem, " Secondary Market Trading and the 500




19. William K. Sjostrom, Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, I HARV.
Bus. L. REv. ONLINE 43, 45 (2011). Note, however, that his problem may be
significantly alleviated by the JOBS Act.
20. However, sometimes investor protection reforms come by way of rules that
explicitly require or prohibit certain behaviors. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g (setting margin
requirements for securities purchased on credit).
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the conclusion that, while certain constituencies must bear the burden of
greater disclosure, a net gain throughout the capital markets justifies the
reform.
B. Capital Formation Reforms
1. Regulation D, Rule 506
Regulation D, a series of SEC rules grounded in the '33 Act, was
promulgated in 1982. The rules operate to exempt certain "private"
securities offerings from Section 5 registration. The most commonly relied
upon of the Regulation D rules, Rule 506, serves as a non-exclusive safe
harbor to Section 4(2)'s exemption for issuer transactions not involving a
public offering.2 1 Prior to Rule 506, the SEC had released a series of rules
attempting to provide guidance on the availability of the private offering
exemption.2 2 The policy rationale for Rule 506 is well documented:
Regulation D was designed to facilitate capital formation, while
protecting investors, by simplifying and clarifying the existing
exemptions for private or limited offerings, expanding their availability,
and providing more uniformity between federal and state exemptions.
Although Regulation D originated as an effort to assist small business
capital formation, com anies of all sizes may use the Regulation D
registration exemptions.
Rule 506 now exists as the cornerstone exemptive authority for many
private securities offerings, from hedge funds to EGCs.2 4  Based on
concerns that an inconsistent registration exemption scheme would
discourage companies from raising capital, Regulation D and Rule 506 in
particular are classic examples of the SEC's dual concern for investor
protection and capital formation. What is interesting for the purpose of this
paper is what the invocation and amendment of Rule 506 tells us about the
justifications for disclosure reform. Two observations are particularly
relevant.
The first touches on the mindset of the SEC, if such a thing can be
deciphered, when promulgating Regulation D. Nowhere in the thirty-three
pages of its Regulation D release does the SEC mention job creation as
either a direct or indirect rationale for the reform. Capital formation,
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011).
22. See generally Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for
Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33,6389
(Mar. 8, 1982).
23. Id. at 2.
24. See VLAD IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION 1
(2012).
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however, is highlighted in the release's first paragraph.25 This is important
not because this means that the SEC, and others that influenced the
Regulation D reform, did not ever consider the reform's effects on job
creation. More important is the observation that for Regulation D
purposes, capital formation may, but need not, touch on job creation; it is a
broader concept.
The notion that capital formation is a broader concept than job creation
is supported by data gathered on Regulation D filings for the years 2009
and 2010.26 Two SEC economists were tasked with gathering and
analyzing data on all Regulation D filings (done on Form D) during this
two year period. The study was intended to "inform the Commission on
the amount and nature of capital raised through unregistered offerings
claiming a Regulation D exemption, and to provide some preliminary
perspective on the state of competition and regulatory burden in capital
markets."27 Their findings detail two interesting sub-observations.
First, the data demonstrate that, of the various types of issuers using
Regulation D, the majority (twenty-nine percent) are pooled investment
vehicles as opposed to individual issuers.28 Of that twenty-nine percent,
the largest fund type using Regulation D is hedge funds fifty-five percent.
This finding is highlighted not to suggest that hedge funds have some sort
of unequal influence over the private formation of capital. Rather, the
dominant use of Regulation D by pooled funds, especially hedge funds,
strongly suggests that capital formation does not necessarily create jobs.
Hedge funds are simply private funds that invest limited partner assets
through the acquisition of securities in capital markets. Hedge funds do not
aim to create jobs for their investors; they aim to create above-market
returns through a variety of trading strategies. While this may sound
nefarious, I would argue that capital formation through pooled investment
funds is generally anything but that. Public mutual funds as well as private
funds form capital to provide investors with professional money
management for retirement or general capital appreciation.
25. See supra note 22, at 1. The Commission announced the adoption of a new
regulation governing certain offers and sales of securities without registration under the
Securities Act of 1933 and a uniform notice of sales form to be used for all offerings
under the regulation. The regulation replaced three exemptions and four forms, all of
which were being rescinded. The new regulation was designed to simplify and clarify
existing exemptions, to expand their availability, and to achieve uniformity between
federal and state exemptions in order to facilitate capital formation consistent with the
protection of investors.
26. See IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 24. These were the first two full years
that the SEC changed to electronic filing of Form D.
27. See id. at 1.
28. Id.
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The second sub-observation that the data highlight is the trend from
public to private capital raising. The authors note that beginning in 2010,
private offerings raised eight percent more capital than public offerings.29
The trend continued in 2011, as of the date of the study. The distinction
between public and private offerings signals a well-detailed trend away
from initial public offerings ("IPO") and the embrace of strategic
combinations.0 It is generally understood that IPOs are a greater job
creator than mergers or acquisitions.3 1 The trend in private offerings shows
that to a large extent, issuers may be using Regulation D to raise capital
with aspirations of becoming an attractive acquisition target. While it is
true that private capital offerings can grow a business and position it to
create jobs, if such a company is vying to be acquired, that job growth
might be temporary at best or at worst could lead to short term job losses
through the elimination of redundant positions.32
A second feature of Regulation D, as a capital formation reform, is the
notion of investor sophistication. Capital formation reforms necessarily
require Congress, and more likely the rule makers at the SEC, to weigh the
tradeoffs to investor protection. The SEC has historically felt comfortable
with a decrease in investor protection to so-called sophisticated investors:
those thought to be able to "fend for themselves" because of their financial
sophistication or previous investment experience.33 Not all of Regulation
D restricts sales exclusively to accredited investors. Rule 504 contains no
minimum investor net worth or income test.34 Designed to assist small
issuers in raising private capital,35 Rule 504 may appear to violate the
investor sophistication theme of Regulation D, and it does to the extent that
no accreditation standards are present. However, it must be noted that Rule
504 offerings are capped at $1 million in a twelve-month period.36 This
mechanism still favors the notion that issuers should be limited in the
extent to which they may access "unsophisticated" investor capital. In
addition, in order for an issuer to avoid the prohibition on general
29. Id. at 3.
30. Xiaohui Gao, et al., Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, at 4-5 (2011), available at https://www.sec.gov/info/sm
allbus/acsec/acsec-090712-ritter-slides.pdf.
31. See e.g., supra note 5, at 7.
32. Id.
33. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (supporting the
proposition that hose close to a transaction can bear the risk of an investment); see also
17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2011).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504.
35. See supra note 22, at 3. ("Rule 504 is an effort by the Commission to set aside
a clear and workable exemption for small offerings by small issuers.").
36. See supra note 34.
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solicitation in most cases, it must register the offering on the state level.
Thus, even when Regulation D eases the accreditation standards, it cabins
in the extent to which non-accredited investors can participate in such
offerings.
Regulation D, and other disclosure reforms that attempt to lower the
regulatory burden on securities issuers, do naturally have some effect on
job creation. It is not the goal of this paper to deny the impact that
securities disclosure reform has on the macro economy in general and job
creation specifically. To be sure, in the late 1970s there was a push to
reexamine the impact of federal securities regulation on small businesses.
The SEC was tasked with studying and making recommendations on how
small businesses could access investor capital while still ensuring adequate
investor protection. The SEC introduced the process as follows:
The study of the problems confronting small businesses, while a topic of
longstanding interest, has recently become the focus of considerable
public attention. The wealth of concern for the well-being of that sector
stems from the pivotal role it plays in the vitality of the general
economy. The contribution of small businesses in supplying jobs,
technical innovation, and generally in keeping our system competitive
requires that unnecessary obstacles to their formation and growth be
removed.
Recent Congressional hearings and studies, studies by Government
agencies and the professional literature have attempted to isolate and
analyze the factors which impede the success of small businesses. These
investigations have shown that the small business problem is
exceedingly complex. In large part, it appears that the obstacles faced by
small businesses are the product of factors deeply rooted in the economic
environment as well as taxation and regulatory policies which are outside
the scope of the federal securities laws. Nevertheless, there have been
suggestions that the Commission's registration and periodic reporting
requirements impose a relatively greater compliance, burden on small
companies than on large ones. Some have contended further that the net
effect of these policies is to endanger the continued existence of smaller
companies and to inhibit the formation of new enterprises.3 8
Regulation A is a series of SEC rules aimed at exempting from full
registration, securities issued by small and emerging businesses. The
offering limit in a twelve-month period has changed over time due to the
nature of the marketplace. It currently stands at $5 million; however, the
JOBS Act requires the SEC to expand the limit to $50 million.
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)(i).
38. See generally Examination of the Effects of Rules and Regulations on the
Ability of Small Businesses to Raise Capital, Securities Act Release No. 33,59 14 (Mar.
6, 1978).
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My reason for highlighting the potentially job-creating policy of
Regulation A is to argue that while jobs may occupy some space in the
disclosure reform conversation, it is an indirect one. I further argue that job
creation is one concept embodied by the broader term capital formation but
that the two are not mutually exclusive.
2. The Evolution of the SEC's Gun Jumping Rules up to the JOBS
Act
Section 5 of the '33 Act regulates public securities offerings. As a result
of the once-dominant role of the IPO, this section serves a gatekeeping
function with respect to the requirements an issuer must follow before
offering or selling securities to the public. Section 5(a) makes it unlawful
to sell a security unless a registration statement has been filed with the
SEC, except for when the issuer relies upon a valid exemption.39 Section
5(b) deems it unlawful to transmit a prospectus relating to a registered
security unless that prospectus both meets the statutory requirements of a
prospectus, and the sale of a security is either accompanied or preceded by
such a valid prospectus.40 Finally, and the area of focus for this paper's
gun jumping analysis, Section 5(c) prohibits parties (usually directed at
issuers and underwriters) from offering to sell a security unless a
registration statement has been filed with the SEC.4 1 The term "offer" or
"offer to sell" is defined broadly as "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for
value."42
This registration regime makes way for a fully temporal system
regulating permissible communications prior to and during a public
offering, known as "gun jumping" rules. The gun jumping rules are
intended to confront an essential problem with Section 5(c)'s use of the
word "offer" and its broad definition. What is a permissible
communication before the registration statement has been filed and who
may make it?4 3 The SEC does not want interested parties to skirt the
registration and disclosure rules prior to the time they take effect.
Historically, oral and written "offers" by an issuer were not permitted prior
to the filing of a registration statement. While serving a potential investor
protection end, this policy was thought to hurt the capital formation process
by cutting off valuable access to information in anticipation of an IPO.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2010).
40. Id. § 77e(b).
41. Id. § 77e(c).
42. See id. § 77b(a)(3).
43. The gun jumping rules also deal with communications once the registration
statement has been filed but before being accepted (known as the "waiting period").
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One of the reforms designed to open up the stream of communication for
issuers was SEC Rule 135. Rule 135 provides an issuer with a non-
exclusive safe harbor to divulge certain pre-filing information about an up-
coming public offering.4 Under the rule, issuers may provide general
notices including information such as the following: the issuer's name,
title, amount, and basic terms of the security as well as the anticipated time
of the offering. In addition, the issuer may briefly discuss the manner and
purpose of the offering as long as the identity of the underwriter is not
disclosed.45 To ensure compliance, the SEC requires issuers to make a
notice filing of any communications relied upon pursuant to the rule.46
Along similar but slightly different lines, Rule 163A provides issuers with
another non-exclusive safe harbor for communications made by or on
behalf of an issuer during a period concluding thirty days prior to filing a
registration statement.4 7  The safe harbor is only available for
communications that do not make reference to "a securities offering that is
or will be the subject of a registration statement."48 Both safe harbors are
not meant to shield from securities' anti-fraud provisions.
Another area of gun jumping reform that receives fairly consistent
attention focuses on research reports and fundamental analyses produced
by financial analysts. Previous gun jumping rules could be construed such
that analyst reports might violate Section 5(c)'s prohibition on premature
securities offerings. SEC Rule 137 provides a safe harbor for certain
research analysts to release reports about an issuer going through the IPO
process. In a significant reform to Rule 137, the SEC noted, ". . . we
believe it is appropriate to make measured revisions to the research rules
that are consistent with investor protection but that will permit
dissemination of research around the time of an offering under a broader
range of circumstances."49 Rule 137 requires analysis-producing broker-
dealers to meet certain requirements in order to avoid potential gun
jumping liability. For example, the broker-dealer must not be participating
in the registered offering nor may they receive any compensation from the
issuer or any of its affiliates for producing the analysis. Finally, the broker-
dealer must publish or distribute the report in its regular course of
44. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2011).
45. Id.
46. See generally Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications,
Securities Act Release No. 33,7760 (Oct. 22, 1999).
47. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.163A.
48. Id.
49. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33,8591, at 156
(Dec. 1, 2005).
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business.50 Analyst reforms were the result of an industry push to liberalize
the scope of eligible communications prior to and during an issuer's IPO,
reflecting new electronic communication methods.5'
The gun jumping rules and their reforms reflect similar yet slightly
different notes on the theme of capital formation compared with Regulation
D. While Regulation D rules attempt to spur capital formation through
private (exempt) securities offerings, the gun jumping reforms are in the
context of public offerings. In one sense, capital formation reforms in the
public arena can be seen as a more aggressive push toward encouraging
capital formation. Instead of limiting the reform to the private, accredited
investor population, the gun jumping reforms evince a willingness to cut
into some of the investor protection so famously insisted upon in the public
markets. Also relevant to the gun jumping reforms is the concept of the
role of information in the public markets. At first blush, it might be easily
understood that information in public markets can only serve positive ends.
However, as demonstrated through the gun jumping rules, the SEC is
sensitive to the timing of publicly released information. In other words,
information to the public markets can be positive, but it must not be
released too early, in violation of the gun jumping rules.
The history of securities law disclosure reform, as outlined above, serves
as a useful baseline to understand the JOBS Act's disclosure reforms. This
history reflects that disclosure reform has been driven by investor
protection and capital formation concerns. Job creation has served, if at all,
as a derivative of capital formation as seen in Regulation A.
II. THE JOBS ACT'S APPROACH TO SECURITIES DISCLOSURE THEORY
The JOBS Act's primary method in achieving its goal of job creation is
to reform certain disclosure requirements of the '33 and '34 Acts. As
mentioned above, disclosure is at the heart of the regulatory approach to
securities transactions in both primary and secondary markets. As such,
there is a well-documented body of scholarship on the issue of disclosure in
federal and state securities regulation.52 Background questions are debated
(should we retain our mandatory federal disclosure regime?), as well as
50. Id. at 162.
5 1. Id. at 1.
52. While the scholarship on disclosure theory includes dozens of articles, I have
made the decision to highlight three perspectives that I believe articulates the debate on
securities disclosure law and policy. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984)
(offering a public choice theory behind the mandatory disclosure principle); see also
Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 763 (1995) (describing the price "accuracy enhancement" theory of disclosure
and its practical effect on the nature of information disclosed).
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secondary questions (if we do retain federal disclosure, which disclosures
should we require and what metrics do we use to answer that question?).
These two questions will form the basis for this paper's review of securities
disclosure theory. In order to understand the disclosure approach that the
JOBS Act takes, it is important to discuss this securities disclosure
orthodoxy. With that foundation in place, my analysis of the JOBS Act's
disclosure reforms will be set in the right context.
A. Securities Disclosure Orthodoxy: From Mandatory Disclosure to
Issuer Choice
This section attempts to provide the reader with an overview of past
disclosure orthodoxy so that the JOBS Act's disclosure choices can be
understood in context. Three prominent securities disclosure academics are
highlighted, each reflecting a different approach to disclosure's benefits
and burdens. Simultaneously, there exists a shared narrative around the
parties directly affected by disclosure regardless of the tenor of the
disclosure regime. The subsequent section analyzes how the JOBS Act
may alter this thinking and what it means for modern securities disclosure.
1. Merritt Fox
Columbia Law School's Merritt Fox takes a somewhat law and
economics approach to the issue of securities disclosure. He discusses
disclosure as an activity that entails social costs and social benefits, as well
as private costs and private benefits.5 3  Disclosed information about
securities issuers, according to Fox, produces social benefits such as
improved selection of new investment opportunities, improved managerial
perf6rmance, and lower investor risk. Social costs include the time spent
by lawyers and accountants in meticulously preparing mandatory
disclosure documents, as well as the "diversions" of issuer management
and staff in the time spent gathering and producing disclosure
information.54 Fox goes on to state that "[t]he issuer's socially optimal
level of disclosure is reached when the marginal social benefits equal the
marginal social costs."5 5 In other words, there is some point that we could
call an equilibrium at which the level and amount of mandatory disclosure
optimally balances Fox's social benefits and costs. Considering society's
finite resources (time, capital, human resources), this equilibrium is the
ultimate goal that securities disclosure should attempt to reach.
53. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA L. REV. 1335, 1338-39 (1999).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1339.
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Against the backdrop of social optimality are an issuer's private
disclosure benefits and costs. Issuers often gain private benefits from
disclosure because it can reduce the cost of capital due to the reduced risks
of the investment.56 Importantly, Fox states that there are two variations of
private costs of disclosure. First, operational costs are the "out-of-pocket
expenses and the diversions of management and staff time that issuers incur
to provide the required information."5 7 While operational costs are also
included in Fox's "social costs," there is little doubt that this cost is felt at
the firm level. The second private cost, interfirm costs, "arise from the fact
that the information provided can put the issuer at a disadvantage relative
to its competitors, major suppliers, and major customers."5 8 Fox notes that
interfirm costs are just costs to the issuer because of the corresponding
benefit that other firms attain from such disclosure.
This distinction between social and private cost and benefit is Fox's
primary evidence for why we should retain mandatory federal securities
disclosure laws ("mandatory disclosure") in the United States. "Issuer
choice," discussed below in connection with Professor Romano, is the
alternative to mandatory disclosure in that it would permit the issuer to
choose which jurisdiction regulates it (the SEC, states, or possibly even
foreign jurisdictions). Fox argues that if issuers were able to choose among
a varying level of disclosure regimes, the issuer would rationally choose a
lower disclosure level than would be socially optimal. This is because of
the private costs of disclosure to issuers, particularly interfirm costs. Put a
different way, Fox is saying that because of the private (firm-level) costs of
disclosure, if they had the option, issuers would migrate to a jurisdiction
that required a less socially optimal (but more privately optimal) level of
disclosure. Fox notes that "[t]his divergence of private from social costs
means that issuer choice will lead to market failure and thus presents a
serious problem for the proponents of issuer choice."59 Professor Fox's
approach stands as a firm defense of the mandatory federal disclosure
regime implemented by the SEC. Fox assumes that if they had the option,
issuers would lead the "race to the bottom" to jurisdictions that reduced the
private costs of disclosure.
2. Michael Guttentag
Professor Michael Guttentag of Loyola Law School takes a middle road
position in the debate on mandatory disclosure versus issuer choice. He is
56. Id. at 1358.
57. Id. at 1345.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1346.
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unsatisfied that Fox assumes, without truly balancing costs and benefits of
a particular disclosure requirement or proposal, that issuers would always
choose less disclosure. Guttentag notes that "a comprehensive
microeconomic analysis of disclosure actually can be used to determine the
,,60efficacy of specific disclosure requirements ....
Guttentag lays out three categories under which it is most useful to
analyze disclosure requirements:
(1) Costs and benefits realized whether or not a company has publicly
traded securities (2) costs and benefits realized only when a company has
publicly traded securities and (3) costs and benefits from disclosure that
are not realized by the company making the disclosure (externalities).61
Guttentag pays homage to the generally accepted benefits from
disclosures by an issuer, which include reduced agency costs, lower capital
costs, improved liquidity for an issuer's shares, as well as many benefits
that an issuer making a disclosure may not itself fully capture (analogous to
Fox's "interfirm" costs). He does not, as Fox did, organize the costs and
benefits of disclosure by social and private standards, although such
standards do play into each of his three categories.
Category one, the costs and benefits realized whether or not a company
has publicly traded shares, takes a broad approach because of the sheer
number of firms that fall into it. Benefits of disclosure in such
circumstances include reduced agency costs, as well as the reduction in the
amount of information to which managers have exclusive access.62 This
latter benefit reduces the likelihood that firm managers can hold firms
hostage by threat of departing to and sharing information with the
competition. Costs of disclosure mostly include "production costs" being
the direct cost to the firm of producing information.
The second category focuses on the costs and benefits of disclosure
solely for public firms. The primary benefit is that of improved share price
accuracy, which can also reduce agency costs and also provide investors
with "a more reliable indicator of manager performance, and a more
efficient means to reward value creation within the firm." 63 The cost
centers around the "publication cost," which is the "competitive
disadvantage that may result when a firm discloses proprietary
information.,64
The third category focuses on the costs and benefits of disclosure that are
60. Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on
Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 123, 132 (2004).
6 1. Id.
62. Id. at 133-34.
63. Id. at 135.
64. Id. at 140.
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not fully realized by the issuer making the disclosure. Three potential
benefits outside the firm may result from disclosure. First, Guttentag
discusses Professor Fox's "interfirm" theory that competitors can benefit
from disclosed information at a direct cost to the issuer. However,
Guttentag is skeptical that these effects are "always positive or that this
externality can or should be rectified through regulatory intervention."6 5
The second benefit of disclosure by parties outside the issuer is the
economy as a whole. The idea here is that disclosures improve the
allocation of assets through the greater economy and that more accurate
share prices mean more efficient allocation of capital throughout the
economy.6 6 Guttentag admits, however, that "[a]rguments that relate asset
allocation in the economy with public company disclosure requirements
are, at best, anecdotal."67 The final benefit of disclosure outside the issuer
could go to investors that do not hold shares in the disclosing issuer. Such
investors may get a "free look" at issuer fundamentals meaning that they
bear no production costs. Finally, as for potential costs linked with parties
in the third category, Guttentag lays out an example to demonstrate the
idea. He imagines two firms that both have information that they use for a
competitive advantage. If one of those firms is suddenly required to
publicly disclose that informational advantage, the profits of both firms
would reasonably be harmed due to the dependence on such information
staying private.
Guttentag notes that "[a] hybrid regulatory scheme, including some
mandatory provisions and some provisions applicable only in certain
regimes, could provide an attractive degree of flexibility." 69 Through his
methodical balancing system, Guttentag attempts to demonstrate that some
disclosure requirements may be justified but that others are not. While he
attempts to answer this question through balancing, the test is extremely
subjective and could vary widely in its application.
3. Roberta Romano
Yale Law School's Roberta Romano advocates for what she calls the
"market approach" to securities regulation.7 0  Also known as "issuer
choice," this approach fundamentally disagrees with the existence of a
mandatory federal securities regulation regime:
65. Id. at 136-37.
66. Id. at 137.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 141.
69. Id. at 193.
70. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 2359, 2361 (1998).
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The market approach to securities regulation . . . takes as its paradigm
the successful experience of the U.S. states in corporate law, in which
the fifty states and the District of Columbia compete for the business of
corporate charters. The proposed market approach can be implemented
by modifying the federal securities laws in favor of a menu approach to
securities regulation under which firms elect whether to be covered by
federal law or by the securities law of a specified state, such as their state
of incorporation.7
Romano's approach values regulatory competition because, as the
argument goes, investors will be empowered through electing whether or
not to allocate their capital to a firm based on the securities regime of the
firm's elected regulator. Romano states that "when the choice of
investments includes variation in legal regimes, promoters of firms will
find that they can obtain a lower cost of capital by choosing the regime that
investors prefer."72  Taking a page out of the state competition for
corporate charters, the market approach to disclosure posits that states will
reform disclosure requirements away from current SEC standards and
toward those thought to be attractive for firms and investors.
Whether both firms and investors would benefit in a market approach is
beyond the scope of this discussion. It is important, however, to highlight
whom Romano sees as the ultimate beneficiaries of the market approach:
investors and firms. By attaining the flexibility to choose their securities
disclosure regime, investors and issuers will ostensibly advance their
interests in lower disclosure costs and higher returns, respectively. Despite
the larger economic issues created by disclosure regime competition, such
as the possibility that more firms would operate in the desired state, no
mention is made of disclosure's effects on jobs.
4. Disclosure Theory - Not About Jobs
The overarching securities disclosure theory paradigm is designed to
analyze the costs and benefits of disclosure. Whether a particular
disclosure requirement is a desirable one depends on an analysis of whom
the reform will benefit and whom it will harm and by how much. The
common thread running through classic securities disclosure theory is that
the cost/benefit analysis is largely done on a micro economic scale. That
is, the costs and benefits of disclosure are considered as impacting parties
in their individual or group-specific capacities as shareholders, issuers, and
competitor firms. Classic securities disclosure theory does not factor in
macro economic elements such as job creation into its mix of
considerations.
71. Id. at 2361-62.
72. Id. at 2366.
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Professor Guttentag's three cost benefit categories focus on issues of
agency costs (investors monitoring firm officers), time spent preparing and
disseminating disclosure information (firm lawyers and auditors), and
publishing proprietary information (competing firms). Only once, in the
context of the impact of disclosure on parties other than issuers, does he
mention an impact on the "greater economy." He argues that improved
share price accuracy leads to more efficient asset allocation throughout the
economy. However, not much else is stated as to how policy makers take
efficient asset allocation under consideration when determining whether to
require further disclosure or to scale it back. In addition, asset allocation
decisions do not necessarily implicate job creation; efficient asset
allocation may just mean that investors are more willing to invest in firms
or projects that have no plans for any meaningful job expansion. Indeed, if
assets are efficiently allocated to firms intending to seek a strategic buyer
in a merger or acquisition event, such allocation may very well operate
against job creation. It is arguably the case that, before the JOBS Act and
discussed in further detail below, disclosure burdens were not viewed as
producing a negative externality to the macro economy.
Professor Fox's categories of social costs and benefits of disclosure may
appear to understand disclosure's impact on the national economy.
However, like Guttentag, Fox's sole macro factor centers on the improved
selection of new investments, a social benefit. I believe this factor stands
for the principle that disclosure aids investors. Such investors use society's
finite resources to allocate capital in the most efficient manner, avoiding (to
the extent possible) wasteful investments to unpromising firms. Nothing
further is said about the actual benefits of this efficient allocation resulting
from disclosure. Instead, Fox focuses on disclosure's costs and benefits at
the individual and firm levels. Paying special attention to the private costs
of disclosure, Fox says little in the way of social costs of disclosure except
for the time and talent of disclosure professionals and the diversion that
disclosure causes firms. Finally, Professor Romano's market approach to
securities disclosure centers on two parties: the disclosing firms and their
investors. Shareholders win, so goes her argument, when the firms they
invest in are given the flexibility to choose their own disclosure regime.
B. How the JOBS Act Alters the Focus ofDisclosure
Curiously, none of the three disclosure theorists make the connection
between disclosure requirements and a burden. on job creation. The notion
that securities disclosure has a material impact on the macro employment
picture is simply inconsistent with how we have historically understood
73. See supra note 5.
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securities regulation - as a tool to protect investors and to foster capital
formation. Certainly, there have been instances in the past where
disclosure can be understood as having consequences beyond the firm and
investor levels;. Regulation A is such an example.7 4 Regulation simply
cannot be implemented in isolation. However, for the first time in the
history of securities regulation, the sole and direct rationale driving the
JOBS Act is that one of the costs of securities disclosure is fewer jobs
across the economy. This is a departure from classical disclosure theory.
While we are still examining the costs and benefits of disclosure, we are
now stating unequivocally that a new brand of social cost exists in the form
of burdened job growth. Furthermore, disclosure can apparently have an
impact on those who are not direct participants in the public markets.
Imagine a person who does not invest any of their own savings in the
capital markets and struggles, like many, to find stable employment. The
rationale behind the JOBS Act is that, despite not being a direct stakeholder
in a public company, this person's unemployment is tied, to some extent, to
the problem of a burdensome securities disclosure regime.
1. The Deregulatory Reaction to Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank
The scholarly and public debate about the cost of disclosure reform has
changed dramatically in the past decade. Specifically, there has been an
aggressive pushback against regulatory reforms such as Sarbanes-Oxley
and Dodd-Frank. Sarbanes-Oxley in particular has received attention from
groups such as the American Heritage Foundation and the American
Enterprise Institute.
Commentators view Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley as a prime example
of securities disclosure's job-killing effects. Section 404 requires public
company managers, in its annual reports to the SEC, to "state the
responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting."s In
addition, the report must "contain an assessment ... of the effectiveness of
the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial
reporting."76  Perhaps, most controversially, Section 404(b) requires
"[w]ith respect to the internal control assessment .. . each registered public
accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall
attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the management of the
issuer."7
74. See supra note 38.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)(1) (2012).
76. Id. § 7262(a)(2).
77. Id. § 7262(b).
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For the American Enterprise Institute and others, Section 404(b) has
become a critical example of how disclosure requirements for public
companies impede job creation. In order to understand the concern, an
example may be useful. Suppose Private Co. is a four-year-old non-public
company headquartered in Menlo Park, California, that produces and
develops an intriguing and potentially valuable mobile application. It has a
total staff of fifteen, including its two co-founders. To date, it has received
venture financing to shoulder the considerable research and development
expenses it faces. However, due to its founders' recognition in the Silicon
Valley technology industry, there is some excitement about its growth
prospects as well as some rumblings about a future IPO. In addition, there
are rumors that two large technology companies are seriously considering
making offers to acquire Private Co. Private Co.'s founders, as well as its
venture capital partners, are trying to determine the company's next steps.
What should the company consider as the costs and benefits of going
public?
Alex J. Pollock, a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute
argues that for Private Co., the decision to go public is significantly less
attractive because of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404:
We now know, after the fact, with five years experience, that Sarbanes-
Oxley did indeed unleash a host of expense, paperwork and bureaucracy,
and this disproportionately affects small firms. It makes me think of a
line from the Declaration of Independence which says, in the bill of
particulars against King George III, "He has sent hither swarms of
officers to harass the people and eat out heir substance." You might say
analogously about Sarbanes-Oxley that it has sent hither swarms of
accountants to harass the people and eat out their substance.78
At this point, it should rightfully be asked what he connection is among
Private Co., Sarbanes-Oxley, and job creation. A startup company's
decision to go public, so the thinking goes, is deeply impacted by which
regulatory requirements await them in its new life as a publicly traded
entity. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, without an available exemption, is
thought to create a far larger burden on companies less able to absorb the
cost of compliance. If Section 404 and other recent regulatory reforms are
a strong enough deterrent for private firms, they may delay a public
offering or decide to forego one altogether, opting instead to stay private or
seek a strategic buyer. If private firms remain private longer, the next step
of the story is that fewer jobs are created. Why is that so?
There is a considerable body of evidence that the single largest job
78. Alex J. Pollock, Has Sarbanes-Oxley Harmed Entrepreneurs?, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (May 24, 2007), http://www.aei.org/article/economics/fiscal-
policy/has-sarbanes-oxley-harmed-entrepreneurs/.
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creators in the U.S. economy are small companies that have gone public.
In 2011, the IPO Task Force, a group of economists, industry experts, and
legal academics and practitioners, released a report to the United States
Department of the Treasury with its findings on the dwindling IPO market,
its effects on job creation, and what can be done about it. 79 The report
notes the following:
The role of EGCs in creating American jobs cannot be understated.
From 1980 to 2005, firms less than five years old accounted for all net
job growth in the U.S. In fact, 92 percent of job growth occurs after a
company's initial public offering.80
The report goes on to say -
Over the last decade, the number of EGCs entering the capital markets
through IPOs has plummeted. After achieving a one-year high of 791
IPOs in 1996, the U.S. averaged fewer than 157 per year from 2001 to
2008. Acquisitions by a shrinking number of larger companies (due to
the lack of IPOs) have become the primary liquidity vehicle for venture
capital-backed companies as compared to IPOs. This is significant
because M&A events don't produce the same job growth as IPOs.8 1
The IPO Task Force's paper was almost completely adopted by
Congress as Title I of the JOBS Act. Labeled "Reopening American
Capital Markets to [EGCs]," Title I is a direct response to the declining
IPO market.8 2  The '33 Act is reformed to create a new category of
securities issuer, an EGC.x Such companies must have less than $1 billion
in annual gross revenues in the most recent fiscal year.84 That status is
retained for a period of five years post-IPO assuming that the EGC does not
first exceed $1 billion in revenue in a given fiscal year or sell more than $1
billion in non-convertible debt over a three year period. With this new
status in mind, which would presumably sweep in a significant portion of
private companies considering an IPO, Title I then scales back existing IPO
regulations or institutes new rules in favor of a public offering.
Section 105 of the JOBS Act permits EGCs to "test the waters" for their
public securities without avoiding securities laws as long as such testing is
communicated to qualified institutional buyers.86  The same section also
79. See supra note 5.
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id.
82. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 126-106, § 101, 126
Stat. 306, 307 (2012).
83. Id.
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19) (2012).
85. Id.
86. See id. § 77b(a)(3).
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loosens the constraints on publically available information about the
company. It will not be considered an "offer" under the '33 Act for a
broker-dealer to publish and distribute a research report about the EGC
even if the broker-dealer participates in the offering.8 7 In addition, an
analyst may communicate with the management of an EGC as long as an
investment banker from the same firm is present.88 More liberal analyst
coverage leads to greater information in the market, which in turn can lead
to accurate pricing, greater investor interest, and deeper liquidity for the
security. At the same time, EGCs are given an opportunity (should it serve
their interests) to file a confidential registration statement with the SEC.89
The registration statement becomes public no later than twenty-one days
before the company's road show.9 0
Perhaps, the centerpiece of Title I is its "on-ramp" provisions. In order
to ease the all or nothing requirements of becoming a public company, the
on-ramp eases the transition over a period of five years.9 To carry the on-
ramp analogy further, an EGC may now ease its way onto the public
highway by scaling up to full disclosure once it has spent time getting used
to its existence as a public company. The on-ramp uses the architecture of
scaled back disclosure to achieve this goal. EGCs are exempt from
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404.92 They need not comply with Dodd-Frank's
"say on pay" provisions,9 3 and they need only provide two (as opposed to
three to five) years of financial audited statements.94
Title I has in mind a company much like Private Co., 9 5 which has the
potential to become a successful public company but which might consider
full public disclosure in year one a less attractive option than a high
87. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 126-106, § 105.
88. Id.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(e).
90. Id.
91. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 126-106, § 101.
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b).
93. See id. § 78n-1(e).
94. See id. § 77g(a)(2). Professor Robert Bartlett has gathered some interesting
findings on the early usage trends of the on-ramp. Of his own examination of fifty-
seven registration statements declared effective between August 2012 and February
2013, nine provided a compensation disclosure and analysis, only six used confidential
registration statement treatment, seventeen provided a full three years of audited
financial statements, and thirty-six opted out of relief on new accounting standards. See
Robert Bartlett, The JOBS Act-Where Do We Stand Today?, at 11 (2013) (hereinafter
Bartlett Presentation).
95, The IPO Task Force report poses the following hypothetical: "Imagine how
different Seattle, Cupertino or Austin would look today if-instead of going public-
Microsoft, Apple or Dell had undergone an acquisition by an old-line conglomerate."
See supra note 5, at 7.
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acquisition valuation. While eventually rescinding such favorable
treatment, Title I assumes that, generally, the five years of the on-ramp will
make a difference in a company's decision to enter the public markets or
not. Although there is some evidence to suggest that some eligible firms
will not take advantage of the full on-ramp,96 it is unclear whether the on-
ramp (in conjunction with all of Title I) will be the catalyst for the re-
emergence of the IPO market.97
Yet, not everyone aligns with the notion that IPOs create jobs as
vigorously as the ninety-two percent rate suggests. In their 2012 Kauffman
Foundation report (the "Ritter Report"), Kenney, Patton, and Ritter analyze
employment and revenue growth of domestic operating companies having
undergone an IPO from June 1996 to 2012 in the United States.98 The
Ritter Report finds that, for IPOs occurring between June 1996 and
December 2000,99 total post-IPO employment increased in these firms by
sixty percent.100 For EGC IPOs, post-IPO employment increased by sixty-
two percent, which is "in contrast to a widely quoted number that 90
percent of job creation occurs after the IPO."'O' The Ritter Report links the
ninety percent figure back to an IHS Global Insight study, paid for by the
National Venture Capital Association.'02 In an article, after the release of
the Ritter Report, Professor Ritter questioned the IPO sample on which the
IHS study was based, claiming that there was a tendency to cherry-pick
mega IPOs such as eBay and Google.0 3  The point in highlighting the
Ritter Report's critique is to evidence the broad range of factors supporting
the JOBS Act reform, especially Title I.
Aside from the IPO employment numbers, the Ritter Report teases out
IPO trends by industry sector. Using the same base sample of operating
96. See Bartlett Presentation, supra note 94; see also Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, LLP, The Jobs Act: What We Learned in the First Nine Months
(2013), http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/TheJOBSActWhat
-We LearnedintheFirst Nine Months.pdf (finding that Title I's reduced financial
statement reform garnered "weak acceptance," testing the waters received "mixed
acceptance" and that reforms on research reports" received "mixed acceptance," among
other provisions).
97. See supra note 30, at 28.
98. Martin Kenney et al., Post-IPO Employment and Revenue Growth for the U.S.
IPOs, KAUFMANN FOUNDATION, 1996-20 10, at 3.
99. The author notes that this range was chosen because ten years of post-IPO data
is available.
100. Kenney, supra note 98, at 7.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Jay R. Ritter, The Facebook Effect: How Many Jobs Do IPOs Really Create?,
FORBES (May 21, 2012, 8:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kauffman/
2012/05/21 /the-facebook-effect-how-many-jobs-do-ipos-really-create/.
422 Vol. 4:3
WHERE ARE THE JOBS IN THE JOBS A CT?
company IPOs in the United States between 1996 and 2010, the report
finds that the vast majority of IPOs occurred in the Internet, information
and communication technology, and biomedical spheres.104  Retail,
manufacturing, and service industries lagged far behind in their IPO
volume.'0o In addition, the report found that a few states and regions in
particular had a monopoly in IPO events. The leaders are California,
Massachusetts, New York, Texas, and Florida.10 6 The report also found
that among all EGC IPOs, venture capital firms funded more than fifty
percent of all such companies and that venture capital involvement was
most pronounced in Internet (77.6 percent), biomedical (80.2 percent), and
information and communications technology firms (68.3 percent).107
2. Beyond the IPO Market: Equity Meets the Crowd
The JOBS Act starts rather than stops with IPO reform. Also reformed
are Regulation D and Regulation A provisions as well as the '34 Act
threshold, whereby private companies become required to produce
Exchange Act reports. An additional provision, however, has received at
least as much (if not more) attention than Title I. Title III, simply called
"Crowdfunding" creates a new registration exemption from Section 5 of
the '33 Act.' Taking the lead from previous non-equity crowdsourcing
models such as Kiva, Kickstarter, and Indiegogo, Title III envisions
connecting small businesses with potential investors using the power of the
online "crowd." Title III is a momentous reform to United States securities
law, one which is seen to "disrupt" traditional financing and is often
heralded as "democratizing" it as well.
To achieve this goal, Title III permits crowdfunded issuers to sell
securities directly to unaccredited retail investors without first having to
register those securities under Section 5 of the '33 Act. 09 Crowdfunded
offerings are exempt from state blue sky registration.10 Investor protection
advocates, including the SEC and state securities regulators, have
expressed serious concerns about the mixture of information opacity and a
presumed financially unsophisticated investor base.'1' They point to the
104. Supra note 98, at 14.
105. Id. at 13-14.
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id. at 16.
108. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 126-106, § 201(c)(2)(C),
126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).
110. See id. § 77r(b)(4).
111. Inside Focus: The Jobs Act, NORTH AMERIcAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nasaa.org/issues-and-advocacy/issue-focus/.
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enormous potential for fraud. In attempt to assuage concerns, the
crowdfunding provisions sets limits on the three primary parties involved
in a crowdfunded transaction.
First, investors are capped at the annual amount they can invest in a
company relying on the crowdfunding exemption. For those earning less
than $100,000 per year, their investment cannot exceed the greater of
$2000 or five percent of annual income or net worth.1 12 For investors
earning more than $100,000 per year, investments cannot exceed ten
percent of annual income or net worth, and in no case may the investment
amount to more than $100,000."' Second, crowdfunded issuers are limited
to raising no more than $1,000,000 in reliance on the exemption during the
twelve month period prior to the date of the transaction. 114 Finally, while
the House bill did not envision a middleman, the final version of Title III
requires that sales of crowdfunded securities occur through registered
"funding portals" that will be scrutinized akin to a broker-dealer.115
Title III as well as the other non-IPO reforms point to an interesting
query; if the JOBS Act is motivated by job creation and if IPOs are the
most significant job-creating events, why include the other provisions? In
fact, these provisions (crowdfunding, Regulation D, Regulation A, and the
reform to Section 12(g)) all allow companies to more easily remain private.
This may appear to be an internal contradiction in the structure of the JOBS
Act. However, perhaps it is more indicative of Congress' broad attempt o
achieve the task of putting more Americans back to work. This
congressional goal has changed the way in which we think about the costs
and benefits of securities disclosure theory, and it sets a new precedent for
future reforms.
3. Recent Trends in Securities Disclosure
After a thorough review of legal and financial papers on securities
disclosure, it still cannot be said that much attention has been paid to the
relationship between disclosure and job creation. However, as a result of
the JOBS Act, there has been some commentary that appears to show a
move toward making such a connection even if it is in critical response to
the idea.
In his most recent paper on securities disclosure, Professor Michael
Guttentag plays on a familiar theme by discussing when firms should be
112. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i).
113. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii).
114. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(A).
115. See id §77d-1(a).
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required to comply with federal disclosure requirements.'16 However, his
paper was written in the context of the JOBS Act making it easier for firms
to skirt federally mandated disclosure provisions which "were enacted
based upon a virtually nonexistent legislative record and upended rules
established only after careful consideration almost fifty years earlier."H1 7
Professor Guttentag's paper calls for the creation of a three-tiered system
with respect to what he calls "federal periodic disclosure requirements"
("FPDRs").'18 First, firms with a market capitalization of less than $35
million would receive an automatic exemption from the federal securities
disclosure regime.119 Second, for firms that are not eligible for the
automatic exemption, they may steer clear of disclosure if they take
"specified ameliorative measures to minimize the societal costs from
persistent underdisclosure."20 Third, for firms that do not fit into category
one or two, such firms must comply with the full range of FPDRs.121
While Professor Guttentag presents a new framework for securities
disclosure, the most relevant comments with regard to the JOBS Act come
in the form of discussing who benefits from its passage, specifically the
rules allowing firms to more easily remain private. While he does not drill
down on the job creation theme, he might be seen as dismissing the jobs
rationale through his remarks on who the JOBS Act deems as winners. The
first winners are firms that operate private exchanges, such as
SecondMarket, Inc. Given Title V of the JOBS Act, which now permits
companies with fewer than 2,000 holders of record, Professor Guttentag
notes that "[m]any more firms will probably allow their securities to be
traded on these secondary private markets."l2 2 The second beneficiary is
technology firms and financial institutions. For venture-backed technology
firms, this means that employees receiving options (or even fully vested
shares) will not count toward the 2000 threshold. This provides such firms
with added flexibility to recruit needed talent yet avoid federal disclosure
obligations. Financial institutions, especially banks, will now also be able
to more easily avoid disclosure. Professor Guttentag describes this
deregulatory effort as one that was pushed through Congress with little
116. See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to
Rewrite the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151
(2013) (forming an alternative framework for when firms should be required to comply
with federal disclosure requirements).
117. Id. at 151.
118. Id. at 155.
119. Id. at 200-01.
120. Id. at 199.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 175-76.
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resistance from those that had fought so long to build a thoughtful
disclosure regime.123 It is almost as if he goes out of his way to discuss the
utter lack of debate around such drastic changes to the disclosure status
quo.
Professors Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson, in a recent article
on the dividing line between public and private company status, also
highlight the JOBS Act's Section 12(g) reform.'24 Early in their paper,
they discuss Facebook's pre-JOBS Act dilemma as it was creeping up on
the then 500 shareholders of record threshold.125 The authors find that
Congress sympathized with Facebook's dilemma (i.e. the dilemma between
raising capital and triggering the public reporting requirements of Section
12(g)) and that other technology firms had similar issues. Between the
Section 12(g) reform, crowdfunding, and other JOBS Act reforms, the
authors state that they were "all stylized as job creation mechanisms-a
particularly potent political label heading into an election year-and
bipartisan momentum grew." 26 And while the paper generally discusses
the fault line between public and private company status as evidenced by
Section 12(g), the authors take an opportunity to call crowdfunding "a pure
trade-off of investor protection in the hope of job creation." 27
Outside the legal academy, there has been at least one influential voice
making the connection between securities disclosure and job creation.
Speaking at the Council of Institutional Investors Spring Meeting just one
year before passage of the JOBS Act, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar
highlighted the connection between "the real economy" and "capital
formation."l2 8 While suggesting that part of the SEC's mission, capital
formation, was never specifically defined, he attempted to give some life to
that phrase by noting that it "is about all the ways of creating productive
capital in our economy, including but not limited to improving
infrastructure, building plants, and hiring workers."2 9 Commissioner
Aguilar contrasts that with "raising capital."130 He goes on to state that if
capital formation were just about raising capital, then certain illiquid
123. Id. at 177.
124. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After The JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013).
125. Id. at 338.
126. Id. at 339.
127. Id. at 339 n. 122.
128. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Address at the Council of Institutional Investors Spring Meeting: Facilitating Real
Capital Formation (Apr. 4, 2011).
129. Id. at 2.
130. Id. at 3.
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mortgage-backed securities as well as Ponzi schemes would fit the
definition.131 True capital formation, as a result, would have effects on the
"real economy," which, in the wake of the financial crisis, Aguilar is
particularly concerned with. What is striking is the confluence of events
surrounding the passage of the JOBS Act. Commissioner Aguilar's
statements, symbolic because of his position of authority at the SEC, accept
the position that statutory and regulatory disclosure choices affect the real
economy, including job creation. The "productive capital" understanding
of capital formation provided an intellectual foundation on which the JOBS
Act could solidly stand.
III. WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, SHOULD JOB CREATION PLAY IN THE REFORM OF
SECURITIES LAW DISCLOSURE?
The issue of job creation has played a minor and indirect role in the
history of American securities regulation. When it comes to securities
disclosure requirements, the primary method of analyzing them has been
through a cost/benefit analysis focused on the effects on those parties most
directly involved - issuers and investors. Within the last ten to fifteen
years, however, a new angle on securities disclosure has become
prominent. This new inquiry expands on the historic analysis by
examining disclosure's effects on the macro economy, particularly
employment figures. In this final major section, I will first examine,
through two distinct narratives, whether or not the JOBS Act really is about
jobs. Second, I will highlight certain concerns about reforming disclosure
law through the guise of job creation. Finally, I will propose a framework
for what role job creation can safely play in the reform of securities
disclosure law.
A. Is the JOBS Act Really About Jobs? Two Distinct Narratives
The JOBS Act, despite its extreme brevity (twenty-two pages) allows the
imagination -to wander. Why attempt to create jobs through securities
disclosure? Why was there such a rush to push the bill through Congress,
and why did it receive such unprecedented bi-partisan support? Is there
another story, beyond job creation, that is a driving force behind this
reform? I see at least two stories that can be told.
1. Story One: The JOBS Act as Job Creation Agent
There is ample evidence to support the narrative that the JOBS Act was
passed to help small businesses access investor capital, expand, and in the
process, create jobs. In its report, the IPO Task Force found that between
131. Id.
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1997 and 2001 "the prevalence of IPOs versus acquisitions of EGCs has
undergone a stunning reversal." 3 2 This matters, according to the report,
because mergers and acquisitions ("M&A") do not result in the same high
level job growth as IPOs do.13 3 The report also noted that, according to
United States Labor Department statistics, "up to 22 million jobs may have
been lost because of our broken IPO market."l3 4 The link between IPOs
and job creation is then made in clear terms: "[t]he losers of the IPO crisis
are the [United States] workers who would have been hired by EGCs had
they been able to go public and generate new jobs through their subsequent
growth."13 5
Further examples of a compelling connection between securities
disclosure, the IPO market, and job creation abound. Silicon Valley Bank
conducted a survey of 270 executives of startup companies in late 2012.136
The survey notes that thirty-five percent of respondents stated that their
biggest challenge is the regulatory/political environment.' 37 In addition,
thirty-six percent of executives stated that access to equity financing was
one of their greatest challenges.138 As for the issue of hiring new workers,
the survey found that eighty-three percent of startups have plans to add to
their workforce over the next twelve months.13 9 When asked about the
"importance of potential changes in providing capital," sixty-nine percent
of respondents answered that the IPO on-ramp structure was important.14 0
Seventy-two percent answered that making it easier for private companies
to raise capital from accredited investors was important.141 Even though
this survey was completed after the passage of the JOBS Act, it is the kind
of persuasive evidence that forms the narrative that the JOBS Act is
genuinely concerned about job creation.
Efforts to support the job creation story came on all fronts. Perhaps,
most impactful, from a visceral perspective, were statements from small
businesses owners themselves. Speaking to the House of Representatives,
months before the passage of the final legislation, one small business
owner made a plea that embodies the spirit of the job creation narrative:
132. See supra note 5, at 6.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 7.
135. Id.
136. See generally SILICON VALLEY BANK, STARTUP 2012 OUTLOOK (2012),
available at http://www.svb.com/startup-outlook-2012/.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Id. at 21.
141. Id.
428 Vol. 4:3
WHERE ARE THE JOBS IN THE JOBSACT?
[A]s a small business owner, I know that it's tough to get access to
capital . . . . If a company doesn't have the resources it needs to grow and
expand, then it's virtually impossible to hire new workers. Without a
doubt, by allowing companies access to the markets, we give them the
opportunity to succeed, and, in turn, they will have the opportunity to
create additional jobs, which is what we desperately need. With an
unemployment rate of over 8 percent for the past 34 months and at least
9 percent for 28 of those months, it's about time that we moved forward
on the jobs package that we're trying to push in the House. We need to
step up and get America back to work.142
It is interesting to note that Congress, not the SEC, was the body to enact
the JOBS Act (although the SEC plays a central role in various of the Act's
rulemaking provisions). It supports the job creation story that Congress
spoke so affirmatively. Job creation, after all, is an issue rife with political
underpinnings. Had the SEC been the principal architect, I suggest that
their reforms would have been narrower and more attuned to the principle
of investor protection, not job creation.
2. Story Two: The JOBS Act as More Than Meets the Eye
Story two is a darker or at least a deeper story than story one. Story two
is summarized by a statement from Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) who
succeeded in amending the original house bill:
The problem is that in the guise of job creation, this legislation rolls back
important investor protections and transparency requirements that are
fundamental to our capital markets. Under the legislation the House has
sent us, investors will know less about the companies they are solicited
to invest in. They will have less confidence those companies follow
standard accounting practices. They will have no assurance that the
solicitation they've just received over the Internet or by telephone is for a
legitimate company and not a boiler room fraud operation.
In other words, story two suggests that while job creation may have been
a concern under the JOBS Act, it is at best a background issue. And if jobs
are created through the various mechanisms that define the Act, that is all
the better. But the primary objective is to scale back allegedly draconian
disclosure regulations that have been piling up for decades, highlighted by
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002. Instead of using transparent
language about its primary purpose, proponents of the JOBS Act found it
more politically expedient to couch the reforms in terms of job creation.
After all, what politician would wish to be seen as unsupportive of job-
creating legislation?
142. 157 CONG. REC. H9801-01 (Dec. 16, 2011) (statement of Mr. Dold).
143. 158 CONG. REC. S1776-02 (Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
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As previously mentioned above, a vocal and influential deregulatory
movement arose in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley. Much attention was given
to the issue of small public company compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 404. For example, in 2007, The Heritage Foundation stated that
the SEC underestimated the compliance cost of Sarbanes-Oxley Section
404.144 They highlighted that some compliance cost estimates "put the
average cost of direct compliance costs and outside auditing fees in 2006 at
2.5 percent of a company's revenues."l4 5
Another critical piece of evidence that supports the second story is
objective insight on which kind of entity is using the JOBS Act's job-
creating provisions. Take the IPO on-ramp for example. In his assessment
of fifty-seven EGC registration statements (filed pursuant to Title I of the
JOBS Act), Berkeley Law Professor Robert Bartlett uncovered interesting
data on who is taking advantage of the lessened disclosure. He found that
at least twenty of the fifty-seven entities listed a Standard Industrial
Classification for being a shell corporation or holding company and that at
least nine were so-called blank check acquisition companies. Some were
wholly owned subsidiaries of non-EGCs.146
Professor Usha Rodrigues has provided further insight into the
connection between Title I and non-operating companies that are taking
advantage of the IPO on-ramp provisions. She notes that special purpose
acquisition corporations ("SPACs") are finding it attractive to use the IPO
on-ramp. A SPAC is a blank check or shell corporation that engages in a
public offering to raise a pool of cash in search for a target company to
acquire. Investors buy interests in the SPAC itself, which derives returns
from the target company that it acquires. Rodrigues calls SPACs "in
essence, a one-off private equity fund."1 4 7  SPACs permit ordinary
investors to invest in pooled investment vehicles that, but for its public
offering, retain a private equity strategy and investment opportunity that
most public securities do not. Rodrigues notes that SPACs are not the
operating companies that Congress envisioned using Title 1.148 Rodrigues
uncovered certain findings with regard to SPAC use of Title I:
Indeed, in the eight weeks after the JOBS Act's passage, over a dozen of
144. David C. John & Nancy M. Marano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Do We Need a




146. See Bartlett Presentation, supra note 94, at 11.
147. Usha Rodrigues, SPACs and the JOBS Act, 3 HARv. Bus. L. REv. ONLINE 17
(2012).
148. Id. at 20.
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the companies taking advantage of the new on-ramp option were SPACs.
Four months after the JOBS Act's passage, one out of every nine EGCs
was a SPAC. The trend has not abated; in the first half of August 2012,
one out of five firms that made use of the IPO on-ramp provision were
SPACs. To say the least, SPACs are making good use of the EGC
option. 149
We should expect to see very little job creation coming out of SPAC use
of Title I, which leads to the next line of narrative in story two. Rodrigues
notes that "[n]othing in the JOBS Act requires that EGCs be job creators -
they just have to have 'total annual gross revenues of less than $1
billion.""so While we may take the definition of an EGC for granted, it is
an incredibly important issue because it is the threshold question for
whether a company (SPAC and operating company alike) may use Title I.
If the JOBS Act was intended to create jobs, why not tie the definition of
EGC to, well, job creation? This could be done in numerous ways. Before
using EGC status, a company could be required to show detailed
projections on how it will create jobs, which kinds of jobs, and how long
they would last for. Alternatively, a company could be required to show
that after, say, two years, it has created a certain threshold amount of jobs
or risk losing EGC status. In any event, it is worth noting the complete
lack of job creation metrics that go into the determination of whether or not
a company may use Title I. This supports story two's concern that the
JOBS Act has little or nothing to do with job creation and that it has
everything to do with ratcheting back disclosure regulations at the cost of
investor protection.
While the two narratives tell diverging stories about the purpose of the
JOBS Act, it is also likely, of course, that the heart of the story is
somewhere in between. Perhaps even the most cynical political observer
would have difficulty suggesting that the JOBS Act was in no way about
creating jobs. Likewise, it would be almost bad faith for an industry
representative to suggest that there were not serious efforts to scale back
disclosure requirements. The difficult, and for now unanswerable question,
is whether the JOBS Act will create jobs, and if so, how many and whether
the decrease in investor protection will have been a worthy tradeoff.151
149. Id. at 19.
150. Usha Rodrigues, SPACs and JOBS, THE CONGLOMERATE (Jun. 5, 2012),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/06/spacs-and-jobs.html.
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B. Unintended Consequences ofReforming Disclosure Law Through
the Gloss of Gob Creation
As noted above, the SEC's mission is to "protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.,,152 It could
reasonably be argued, therefore, that the JOBS Act simply made the
decision to favor capital formation over investor protection. However, I
argue that job creation and capital formation are not the same and that
reforming securities disclosure through the politically efficient guise of job
creation can have various unintended consequences on United States
securities markets.
First, the assumption that lowering the regulatory burden on issuers will
leave them with more flexibility and room to create jobs is not without
problems. Harvard Law School's John Coates testified in front of the
House Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment about the
potential effects of the JOBS Act. Professor Coates began his remarks by
suggesting that the framework for thinking about reformation of securities
laws has not been communicated properly.1 5 3 Coates stated that the JOBS
Act proposals change the balance between the costs of raising capital on
the one hand and the combined costs of fraud risk, asymmetry of
information, and unverifiable information on the other.154 Coates noted
that investors charge a higher cost for their capital if there is an anticipation
of fraud or the inability to verify information about their investment.15 It
follows, according to Coates, that disclosure, anti-fraud rules, and
enforcement mechanisms lower the cost of capital.
Interestingly, lowering disclosure and other regulatory requirements can
reduce job creation. This is because, as Professor Coates describes, "a
reduction in [offering] costs can be more than offset in an increase in
capital costs, if the reduction in direct offering costs decreases investor
confidence or the content or reliability of information required by
investors."5 6 This may depend, as Coates concedes, on just how much the
reforms lower offering costs, how widespread the use of the reforms is,
how often fraud can be expected from the new reforms, and how much
more difficult, if at all, it will be to verify company information.'57 While
152. See supra note 6.
153. Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising, Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (written
testimony of Professor John C. Coates IV).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 33.
157. Id.
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the notion that disclosure can lower the cost of capital is well-supported,158
as discussed in the previous section, the connection between disclosure and
job creation has not traditionally been made.
Second, ensuring that small businesses gain fair access to investor capital
is an interest that the SEC must meet, but the goal should not necessarily be
that all small businesses receive investor-backed capital. For example, if
more companies can access capital through the IPO on-ramp, through
crowdfunding, or through various of the JOBS Act's other provisions, what
does this say about job creation? If all provisions include lessened
disclosure and fewer investor safeguards, more cash in the hands of new
companies might create something of a bubble effect. Kathleen Shelton
Smith, Co-Founder of Renaissance Capital, LLC testified in front of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs about just this
problem.
Measures to ease costly regulatory burdens that weigh most heavily on
small firms may be helpful. At the same time, care must be taken in
waiving certain disclosure and stock promotion rules that could result in
misallocating capital to weak or fraudulent companies. Weak companies
that ultimately fail cause job losses, not job creation, and result in serious
stock market losses to investors who abandon the IPO market, as was the
case after the internet bubble burst.159
While Congress nor the SEC will be able to perfectly locate the dividing
line between job creation and job destruction, Shelton Smith's caution is a
valid one. If nothing else, it cautions Congress, and the SEC as rulemaking
implementer, that we should not get blinded by the excitement that more
small businesses will receive investor money. Former SEC Chief
Accountant Lynn E. Turner agrees. Testifying at the same hearing as
Shelton Smith, Turner recalled the dotcom bubble of the late 90s:
In fact, during the heydays of the IPO market of the 1990's, many
companies went public and took money from investors that never should
have. Yet shortly after going public, as Exhibit 2 notes, many failed,
causing investors great losses in their retirement and college education
savings accounts, and destroyed over a hundred thousand jobs. Many
large pension funds have never been able to recover to their pre dot com
bust funding levels, leaving Americans wondering where the money will
come for their retirement.
158. See supra note 116, at 179.
159. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors,
Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
44 (2012) (written testimony of Kathleen Shelton Smith).
160. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors,
Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
10 (2012) (written testimony of Lynn E. Turner).
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The second unintended consequence, in summary, is that of a bubble
effect. Just because more companies can issue securities to a wider
audience, it does not necessarily follow that these are sound investments.
Best case scenario, investors will have more companies to invest in,
perhaps diversifying their portfolio. Worst case scenario, investors rush to
place capital in untested companies without regard for fundamentals,
leading to a small issuer bubble. In any event, the SEC should be vigilant
in bringing enforcement actions against fraudulent issuers, setting the
precedent that systemic risks will be monitored closely.
The third issue is part unintended consequence and partially a plea that
SEC's "capital formation" mission not be considered synonymous with job
creation. While capital formation can lead to job creation, it does not
necessarily do so. If we were to operate under the assumption that the job
creation goal behind the JOBS Act is simply exercising the capital
formation directive, I argue that this is going too far because it
misconstrues the various other factors that capital formation embodies.
Consider the various ways, through the following non-exhaustive list,
whereby capital can be raised with little to no job creation resulting. First,
an issuer could raise capital to invest in a certain technology that, instead of
creating jobs, makes current jobs duplicative and eventually unnecessary.
Second, a company could raise money to pay off certain debt obligations
without investing in infrastructure or personnel. Third, and finally, entities
could raise capital not for the purpose of adding to an operating company's
human resources as is common in the financing of private funds. As
discussed above in Section II, there is strong evidence that the most
frequent users of Regulation D are not operating companies, but they are
private investment funds such as hedge funds and private equity funds.
The direct purpose of this capital formation is not job creation, although an
argument could be made that some job creation could result from these
private fund activities. Rather, the purpose of this kind of capital formation
is to realize investor gains and for the general partner to operate a
successful and lucrative management firm. In any event, the noteworthy
issue here is that capital formation and job creation should not be confused
as being fully aligned. While they do converge under various conditions,
they also diverge in important ways. Because this is true, calling the JOBS
Act a "capital formation" act does not reveal the full nuance of what capital
formation is and how the SEC attempts to both encourage it and restrain it.
If we conflate capital formation with job creation, we risk scaling back
investor protections because the politically expedient notion of job creation
could easily trump investor protection. It is important that we understand
the full scope of the underpinnings of reform before we start any cost/
benefit analyses.
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C. What Is the Proper Role ofJob Creation in Securities Disclosure
Reform?
The vast history of American securities regulation demonstrates hat job
creation plays, at best, an indirect relationship with the reformation of
disclosure. In most cases, job creation does not play a role at all. Over the
last decade, a shift has occurred to include the jobs picture in the same
conversation as securities regulation, especially on the issue of disclosure.
A vocal critical mass has reacted to what is perceived as an overzealous
response to the accounting scandals of the early 2000s and the financial
crisis of 2008. I would go so far to say that the issue of job creation is now
a bona fide factor that merits some attention when considering public
company disclosure requirements. It would seem that, given our connected
financial markets, the days of a dividing line between capital markets and
macro economic concepts is blurrier than it ever has been.
This change is clearly demonstrated by Title I of the JOBS Act. I would
suggest that there is indeed a legitimate connection between the IPO market
and job creation. This point is not only intuitive; it is also supported by
empirical evidence.1 61 The decision of whether or not to raise capital in the
public markets necessarily involves an analysis of whether existence as a
public company is worth the regulatory oversight.16 2 With a more robust
set of public company regulations after Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank,
that public/private decision is not necessarily a simple analysis. If IPOs
really are the job-creating events that the data suggest hey are, then there is
truly something at stake for the United States employment picture. In
passing Title I, I would argue that Congress does not have to predict the
arch of the IPO market. While small company IPOs are down, that does
not mean that Title I is an invalid idea. Additionally, it is important to
remember that Title I does not relieve EGCs from full public company
disclosure requirements forever. As much as EGCs can initially avoid
certain disclosures, they must attain full public company compliance in at
most five years. In summary, I believe that there is a valid connection
between jobs and disclosure in Title I. The regulatory climate has changed
to incorporate rather than exclude securities disclosure from larger
economic issues such as employment rates. How then, do the other parts of
the JOBS Act hold up in this new model? When should jobs be part of
disclosure reform and when should they be excluded?
The majority of the remaining provisions in the JOBS Act are a different
matter. For example, Title III's crowdfunding provisions do not possess an
innate connection with job creation. While the provision does afford small
161. See supra note 5.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2012).
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businesses a unique new alternative to raise capital through equity sales,
the net result is less about job creation and more about the ease with which
capital formation takes shape. As I noted above, job creation and capital
formation diverge in important ways. Small businesses, that could
presumably take advantage of the crowdfunding provisions, have not had to
rely on crowdfunding to form and operate their companies. Various
sources of capital for such non capital-intensive businesses have and still
are available: friends and family money, bank loans, and other loan
financing and borrowing options. Whether jobs will all of a sudden be
created by crowdfunding is a question that does not have an easy answer;
time will tell whether such offerings produce jobs. A second example of
the tenuous connection between jobs and the JOBS Act is found in Title V
of the Act. Private companies may now avoid '34 Act reporting
obligations (and therefore essentially refrain from being "forced" to go
public) by maintaining fewer than 2,000 investors or fewer than 500 non-
accredited investors. While the goal of permitting companies to stay
private longer is not itself an ill-intentioned one, the job creation portion
runs up against an internal inconsistency. If IPOs are the job-creating
events that Tittle I suggests, then allowing companies to stay further and
further away from an IPO may not align with the job creation vision. It
could be argued that the JOBS Act is really a buffet line of choices for
entrepreneurs to choose their best funding options. Be that as it may, it
remains troubling to slap the "job creation" sticker on the entire Act even
though various parts of the Act operate to the contrary.
Assuming that the job creation and employment themes are here to stay
in securities disclosure, what then should be the proper role of this theme in
future disclosure debates? This section concludes with a framework that I
suggest could be a way to thoughtfully decide if job creation should play a
direct role in securities disclosure reform. Each of the framework's three
components is discussed in turn.
First, some empirical evidence about the connection between job
creation and disclosure should be presented and analyzed. Because job
creation is a relatively new direct consideration in reforming disclosure, I
suggest that the burden of production rest with the party making the job
creation connection. While I am not offering a precise mechanism to
determine exactly how and when such a burden is met, the evidence that
supported Title I of the JOBS Act is a good starting point. The IPO Task
Force Report contained a detailed overview and analysis on the connection
between the IPO market and the employment health of the United Statesl63
163. While this data was disputed in the Ritter Report, my point is not to drum up
controversy; rather, it is to suggest that some empirical work should be presented,
leaving their merits up to Congress, the SEC, and the various other constituencies.
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The remaining provisions in the Act were not accompanied by any such
analysis. Because of the concerns about unintended consequences listed
above, the job creation position should not simply be taken for granted as
happened in the passage of the JOBS Act. There was almost a sense that
Congress was scrambling to put all potential job creating options on the
table despite a lack of reasoned analysis and evidence. In the future, the
threshold step for job creation vis a vis securities disclosure should be a
prima facie case demonstrating a legitimate connection.
Second, assuming a prima facie showing is made in step one, a cost/
benefit analysis should be done to determine whether the interests of
reform outweigh the existing disclosure mechanism. This step is not
unique to the job creation element. As mentioned above, the cost/benefit
analysis is a traditional method to understand the merits of disclosure.
There is no reason why the cost/benefit analysis should be eliminated
despite a significant shift in the disclosure paradigm. It could be said that a
cost/benefit analysis is broad enough to permit parties to skew the analysis
in their favor. The reality is that the SEC is generally the arbiter of such
analyses, and interested parties will be incentivized to have their points of
view considered before the SEC promulgates final rules. Interestingly,
Congress, not the SEC, was the body that could have done such a cost/
benefit analysis in the run up to the JOBS Act. In any event, the SEC will
still have considerable JOBS Act discretion as it implements highly
anticipated rules on crowdfunding and general solicitation, among others.
Third, and lastly, assuming that disclosure reform is perceived as the best
way forward, the reform should be limited to the precise issue seen to be
the burden on job creation. This final step comes from an observation
about the JOBS Act. While the legitimate connection between job creation
and disclosure was found in Title I, the job creation theme was used across
the entire Act. In order to ensure that job creation is not an open ended
label for non-job reforms, the reform should be "narrowly tailored" to use
the United States Supreme Court's strict scrutiny language. One example
of narrow tailoring in this context would be to examine which industry the
proposed jobs would benefit. If we are discussing Internet or life sciences
companies, there is a tighter fit between disclosure and job creation than in
the manufacturing or services industries.164 Similarly, if we are examining
a disclosure proposal that would affect certain companies (regardless of
industry sector) over others, what is the job-creation potential of such
companies? While Title I does not condition its EGC definition to any job
creation metrics, a more narrowly tailored examination of lessened
disclosure would discover how such a company would produce jobs for the
164. See supra note 98.
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American economy. Had the narrow tailoring standard been applied to the
JOBS Act, I suggest that Title I would have been the only provision to pass
muster.
This framework is not intended to serve as an appellate court's standard
of review. Nor is it easily applied to congressional action, which, apart
from its constitutionally enumerated powers, need not follow any given
formula to pass legislation. I would still argue that the framework offers
useful guidance for explaining congressional action in the realm of
securities disclosure law. The framework also applies to the SEC in its
deliberations during the rulemaking process. Certainly the SEC will
receive copious public comments about proposed changes to securities
disclosure rules. The framework should be applied when those changes
involve alleged job creating goals.
CONCLUSION
What role, if any, should job creation occupy in the reform of United
States securities disclosure laws? To consider the connection between jobs
and disclosure, historical analysis provides time-tested baseline
justifications for disclosure reform. Investor protection reforms have
focused on enhancing both the strength of disclosure tools and the audience
eligible to reap their benefits. Capital formation reforms emphasize the
need for securities-issuing firms to obtain flexibility in their offerings,
especially to so-called sophisticated investors who may intrinsically need
less disclosure. Both justifications for reform do not directly intend to
bolster job creation. Capital formation has historically been limited to
facilitating transactions between private parties as opposed to making a
larger impact on the real economy. As Commissioner Aguilar points out,
however, that view is now in question.'65
- Changes in disclosure theory also abound. While, historically,
disclosure theory has focused on disclosure's costs and benefits to those
parties immediately involved in a securities transaction, a steady
deregulatory narrative, low employment numbers, and an election year
have all contributed in shifting the disclosure conversation. Disclosure's
costs and benefits (although primarily its costs) are now considered in the
context of the real economy. While little academic attention has been paid
to this directional shift, some commentators have expressed doubt about the
connection between jobs and the JOBS Act. 16 6
While the justification for JOBS Act reforms may be questioned as
165. See supra note 128.
166. See Guttentag, supra note 116; see also Langevort & Thompson, supra note
124.
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having ulterior motives, there may be real and potentially damaging
unintended consequences as a result of them. First, a reduction in offering
costs (due to the lessened cost of disclosure) could be offset by an increase
in the cost of raising capital due to lack of investor confidence in opaque
investments. Second, allocating capital to weak or fraudulent companies
(which attributes may more easily be kept hidden without robust
disclosure) can cause job losses resulting from failed firms and potential
market bubble effects caused by less informed and frenzied investor
behavior. Finally, I argue that job creation is not necessarily capital
formation and that capital formation reforms do not necessarily have to
deemphasize investor protection.
It appears, however, that the real economy, with job creation as the cause
du jour, is now a part of the disclosure conversation. This may be
indicative of a broader trend toward the integration of the disparate facets
of the global financial system, markets, financial institutions, and the
economy sharing a common fate. Therefore, it is useful to consider how
and when jobs should fit into the mix of variables that policymakers
consider when reforming disclosure statutes and rules. First, some
empirical connection between jobs and disclosure should be required.
Without it, disclosure could take on an experimental character that could
produce a less efficient capital markets system. Second, if there. is a
credible connection between jobs and disclosure, a traditional cost/benefit
analysis should be done rather than assuming that disclosure's burdens
outweigh its benefits. Should the disclosure reform prevail, it should be
narrowly tailored to the precise issue that directly affects job creation. The
JOBS Act's Title I is the best example of this closer fit; high technology
and other venture-backed companies have turned away from the IPO
mechanism in favor of strategic combinations through a merger or
acquisition. However, no such direct connection exists (or has at least been
convincingly shown) between small business owners looking to raise
capital over the internet, as Title III will permit once the necessary
crowdfunding rules are in place.
It is noteworthy that in May 2013, the period in which this paper
concludes, the number of Americans seeking "initial jobless benefits" has
decreased to the lowest level since January 2008.16 The unemployment
rate is down slightly at 7.5 percent.68 Rarely do such reports discuss the
167. Eric Morath & Josh Mitchell, U.S. Jobless Claims Fall to 5-Year Low, WALL
ST. J. (May 2, 2013, 11:24 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887
324766604578458602085955608.html?mod=WSJhpLEFTWhatsNewsCollection.




AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA WREVIEW
role that the JOBS Act plays in the employment sphere. In fact, the most
recent jobs report disclosed that he increase of 176,000 private sector jobs
occurred primarily in service industries.6 9 The modest role played by the
JOBS Act could be due to its relative immaturity and lack of fully
implemented rules. We might not fully understand the job-creating
potential of the legislation for years, until jobs data is available, particularly
in the volume of venture-backed IPOs.
The story of the JOBS Act is one of fusion between capital markets and
the macro economy. The reform is a sign of the times it was enacted in,
much like the historical disclosure reforms before it. Yet, it is novel
because never before has job creation served as such a direct justification
for disclosure reform. This new direction must be understood and analyzed
in the context of the larger disclosure regime that has been the foundation
for United States capital markets since the Depression era. Instead of
taking as a given the current premise that disclosure obligations hinder job
creation, we should think critically about why we should reform our
disclosure regime and what it will mean for the larger capital markets and
each of its constituent parts. My hope is that this paper can contribute to
just such a dialogue.
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